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Current debates on the welfare state entail two intertwined questions.  First, does a  
nation have sufficient active labor force participation to maintain the benefits for non-
participants? Second, do social provisions exacerbate or attenuate class, ethnic and other 
distinctions within society?  As predominantly structural or institutional debates, these 
discussions tend to exclude the impact social provisions have on facilitating individual agency 
among members of social groups. Yet the institutions of state, market and family interact to 
shape a gender order which specifies the types of social or civil claims that can be made by 
individuals.  The gender order yields the societal boundaries within which agency can be 
exercised.  This paper will present comparative evidence of how the package of social 
provisions in combination with market factors manifests in women’s agency regarding family 
choices in eight countries.  This, in turn, provides material evidence of whether the 
institutionally-framed gender order encourages gender difference or equity in terms of paid 
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I.  The Welfare State in Context 
Discussions of the welfare state cannot be disentangled from either the market or the 
family.  Early theorists focused on capitalism’s effect on systems of interpersonal relations.  
Weber (1947) posited that the rationalization behind the growth of capitalism results in 
individuals replacing unthinking acceptance of traditions, myths, customs, etc., with deliberate 
consideration of self-interest.  This leads to reassessment of the family unit in terms of how it 
satisfies economic interests.  Polanyi (1947) claimed that capitalism, by commodifying labor, 
breaks down the bonds of reciprocity that force interdependence.  He suggested that the role 
of the state is to intervene when market forces wreck havoc on individual lives.  This could be 
considered the most rudimentary function of the modern welfare state. 
Industrialization also resulted in a sexual division of labor, a division between 
production and reproduction. When production shifted from the field to the factory, the 
nuclear family unit evolved, with men undertaking the paid market work while women carried 
the burden of domestic and child-rearing activities (Chodorow 1999; Reskin & Padavic 1994; 
Weber 1927).  Women’s reproductive work is only indirectly rewarded economically via 
wages paid to working husbands (Dalla Costa 1972).   
Early welfare state provisions reinforced this male-breadwinner model to varying 
degrees, in turn reinforcing both the differences between men and women and the relative 
economic dependence of women on men.  One key mechanism was the evolution of the 
family wage system, justifying men’s superior wages based on their economic responsibility 
for wives and children.  The earliest social provisions across industrialized nations are those 
offering provisions for market wage failures (see Orloff 1996 for a summary).  Maternalism 
movements of the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries sought to ensure that mothers without a     3
male breadwinner through the latter’s death or desertion could receive state payment for the 
work of raising future citizens (Michel & Koven 1990; Skocpol 1992).   Some feminist 
reformers sought recognition for the importance of motherhood in its own right (Pedersen 
1989). In either case, benefits and services for solo mothers always remained inferior to the 
economic circumstances of married mothers.  Thus emerged masculine and feminine strata of 
the welfare state, with claims stemming from market participation generally superior to claims 
stemming from maternity (Bryson 1992; Fraser 1989; Nelson 1990). 
By the early 1960’s, equality emerged as a salient construct in feminist theory.  Many 
feminists focused on women’s ability to participate in and garner equitable rewards from the 
labor market.  This, in turn, decreases the economic need for a nuclear family unit of male 
breadwinner, female caregiver and dependents. This theoretical perspective does not supplant 
that of the legitimacy of women’s claims stemming from motherhood; it is an additional 
avenue of claims on the state for women.  Evidence presented here will demonstrate that 
women’s agency manifests as a trade-off between these two avenues of claims depending 
upon a combination of market and social policy factors.    
Also in the early 1960’s, welfare scholars extended the role of the state to include a 
goal of achieving greater social equality (Wedderburn 1965, as quoted in Ruggie 1984). 
Esping-Andersen (1990) presents perhaps the most-cited crystallization of this concept, 
asserting that the welfare state is a power resource, a reflection of social rights that “push back 
the frontiers of capitalist power” (Heimann (1929) as quoted in Esping-Andersen 1990).     
Equality is achieved when social policy underwrites the removal of certain groups from the 
labor market so that economic equality is maintained regardless of work status.     4
Esping-Andersen (1990) developed a typology of welfare regimes along three 
dimensions.  One dimension is state-market relations, or the extent to which either the state or 
the market provides transfers.  The second dimension is social rights, reflecting the extent to 
which the state grants social rights equal status with property rights, so that citizens have a 
right to “de-commodify” themselves from the cash nexus of capitalist markets. He also views 
the welfare state as a system of stratification in its own right.   
This classification yields Esping-Andersen’s three typologies of welfare regimes: 1) 
corporatist-conservative regimes reinforcing existing stratification and encouraging loyalties 
to the state; 2) social-democratic regimes cultivating cross-class solidarity; and 3) liberal 
regimes reinforcing a dualism of social assistance, wherein only the lowest strata rely on the 
state for means-tested support.  While he acknowledges there are no pure forms of these ideal-
types, Esping-Andersen suggests that continental European countries tend to be corporatist-
conservative regimes, the Nordic countries exemplify social-democratic ones, and the 
English-speaking countries of Australia, Canada, England and the US typify liberal regimes. 
It is at this point that the two theoretical strands concerned with social equality 
collided.  Feminists pointed out that Esping-Andersen’s concept of de-commodification 
implied that a citizen must be an active labor market participant (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993).  
Because of the sexual division of labor, such a citizen is more likely to be male than female.  
By predicating social rights on labor market participation, Esping-Andersen tacitly excluded 
women from the right to make claims. Another critique is the typology’s silence on gender 
differentiated outcomes that result from social policy provisions (Orloff 1993; Lewis 1992; 
Lewis and Ostner 1995; Sainsbury 1994).       5
Orloff (1993) suggests extending Esping-Andersen’s typology to include two further 
dimensions to accommodate gendered elements of the welfare state: the extent of social 
provisions that increase women’s access to paid work, and women’s capacity to establish and 
maintain autonomous households. In other words, the challenge for the welfare state to 
address gender differentiation is to enable women to commodify their work. Such 
commodification can be accomplished either by “(1) establishing secure incomes for women 
who engage in full-time domestic work and caring for their children; and (2) improving access 
to paid work and establishing services that reduce the burden of caring on individual 
households (Orloff 1993, pp. 320).  In this way, Orloff adds a dimension for legitimizing 
women’s claims of both difference (maternity) and equality (work). 
 
II.  Policy Support for Maternal Employment 
A growing research literature has emerged comparing the extent to which social 
policies support women’s employment more generally and maternal employment specifically 
(cf. Bradshaw, Ditch, Holmes & Whiteford 1993; Cochran 1993; Gornick, Meyers & Ross 
1997; Gustafson & Stafford 1995; Kahn and Kamerman 1994; Kamerman and Kahn 1994). 
More recently, the umbrella of “family policies” has been extended to include other 
social policies that directly or indirectly affect women’s labor force participation, such as 
elder care and taxation systems.  Elder care is an important consideration with the increasing 
longevity of the population and often falls to women.  This further disrupts women’s paid 
work.  Whereas a burden of childcare falls earlier in the life course, elder care becomes a 
burden later in the life course.  Taxation systems can either encourage women’s employment     6
by treating all household earners separately, or discourage it by imposing a tax penalty for 
two-earner households.   
Mary Daly (2000) uses this broadened interpretation of family policies to compare 
female labor force participation in 19 countries on two dimensions: extent and continuity.  
Extent is a calculation of full-time equivalent employment among women to adjust for varying 
amounts of part-time employment.  Continuity is a measure of the career path, reflecting 
whether employment on average is interrupted to accommodate childbearing and on-going 
care provision. While Scandinavian countries, representing social-democratic regimes, had 
both high extent and continuity, so did the liberal regimes of the US and Canada, along with 
corporatist-conservative regimes in Portugal, France and Austria.   
Korpi (2000) puts forth that gender differences are the outcome of social polices which 
foster “inequality in terms of manifest achievements of wellbeing, and, on the other hand, 
inequality in terms of freedom to achieve” (2000, pp. 1). In this way, Korpi views social rights 
as shaping patterns of personal agency, with gender differences in labor force participation the 
outcome. To compare countries in this context, Korpi extends the social rights dimension 
along a continuum of support for the dual-earner versus a traditional family model.  In the 
dual-earner model, women’s labor force participation is encouraged by state support for the 
redistribution of care work within society or the family.  This model is prevalent in social-
democratic regimes.  The traditional family model supports the sexual division of labor and 
nuclear family structure wherein a woman’s unpaid domestic work is indirectly remunerated 
via wages paid to the husband.  This model is prevalent in conservative-corporatist regimes.  
The absence of state position along this continuum presumes the development of gender 
agency is left to the market, reflecting liberal welfare regimes’ laissez-faire approach.     7
Incorporating these dimensions and comparing the range of family policy provisions in 
18 OECD countries, Korpi (2000) finds the lowest gender differences, before children, in 
dual-earner support and market-oriented countries.  Once including the presence of pre-school 
aged children, gender differences remain stable in the social-democratic countries, but 
increase in the majority of countries with either a general family support or market-oriented 
model.
2  These results are similar to the country distribution of family wage and employment 
gaps found by Harkness and Waldfogel (1999). 
Policy, coupled with technological advances during industrialization, also allows 
women to control their fertility. Demographer Edward Shorter (1973) attributes the marked 
downward slide in fertility during the late 19th and early 20th centuries across industrialized 
Europe and the US to the diffusion of contraception technology.  This early technology was 
little more than knowledge of coitus interruptus, diffused from mature middle-class women to 
women of other ages and classes (Shorter 1973).  
The next technological breakthrough was the introduction of the birth control pill 
during the 1960’s, not too surprisingly coinciding with feminist claims for gender equality 
rather than differentiation.  Within two decades, women gained control of post-conception 
fertility as well; most industrialized countries revised strict legal bans on abortion in favor of 
more permissive statutes (Glendon 1987).
3  The two countries that hadn’t done so, Belgium 
and Ireland, have since relaxed even their formerly strict bans on the induced termination of 
pregnancy (Rahman, Katzive & Henshaw 1998).  As  shown  in  Table  1,  women’s  current 
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control of fertility is fairly homogenous among industrialized countries.  A majority of women 
use some form of contraception, with most preferring highly effective ones. 
O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver remark the topic of female body rights has been given 
“surprisingly little attention” (1999, pp. 157) in the comparative assessment of welfare states 
despite the politically charged debates surrounding them.  They compared laws governing 
abortion in their assessment of four liberal regimes—Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the 
United States— from the perspective of abortion as a social versus civil right.  This distinction 
has ramifications for the political vulnerability of body right provisions, but does not compare 
the effects of body rights on women’s agency.  Specifically, it does not compare the effects of 
social policy and labor market factors supporting maternal employment, versus national trends 
in changes in fertility that have been made possible by body rights legislation.  While the 
former factors are institutional or structural components affecting gender equality, fertility 
decisions reflect an important element of women’s personal agency vis-à-vis these structural 
or institutional constraints. 
 
III. Gender and the Market: The Decision to Work 
Within economic theory, labor force participation is based on individual preferences 
for paid versus non-paid activity at a given wage rate. Modeling women’s labor force supply 
is more complex than for men due to the sexual division of labor.  Women tend to retain the 
primary responsibility for domestic activity and childcare even when engaged in paid work, 
which in turn reflects in their preferences between paid and unpaid work.  
For example, empirical evidence reveals that the minimum wage at which women will 
work, the “reservation wage,” is higher than for men (Ashenfelter & Heckman 1974;     9
Killingsworth 1983).  Two streams of labor supply theory provide insight into how women’s 
unpaid activities might account for these gender differences in the standard model.  Blau and 
Ferber (1992) posit that domestic duties such as childcare increase the value women place on 
time in the home, making unpaid activities more dear than for men.  Alternately, the cost of 
having childcare and other domestic tasks taken care of by others is really a family “tax” 
levied on women’s wages, effectively lowering the net wage they might earn in the market 
(Connelly 1992; Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel 1992). 
Wages paid to women engaged in family activities, therefore, are crucial to 
encouraging female labor force participation. Yet as of the mid-1990’s, the female-to-male 
wage ratio among industrialized nations ranged from a low of 50 percent in Japan to a high of 
90 percent in Sweden (Waldfogel 1998; pp. 140).   Part of the differential can be explained by 
lower investments in education and experience women undertake if they intend to leave the 
labor force to have and raise children, as evidenced by persistent gaps in pay between women 
with and women without children (Joshi, Paci & Waldfogel 1999; Waldfogel 1997).  In a 
recent analysis of seven industrialized countries, however, Harkness and Waldfogel (1999) 
find evidence that, even controlling for education and experience, women without children 
tend to fare better in hourly wages than women with children.
4    
It has been a tacit assumption in most analyses of female labor supply that women 
prefer family—as economist Becker (1985) claims, reflecting females’ taste for unpaid work.  
Yet even in social-democratic states where social provision of support for maternal 
employment is high and the dual-earner model is encouraged, maternity still coincides with a 
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decline in labor force participation.  Where such supports are absent, the family gap in 
employment is larger still.   This places women on the horns of a dilemma, which, if 
sufficiently egregious, can ultimately force them to choose between work and family.  Such a 
choice is a reflection of the agency granted to women at the intersection of state, market and 
family institutions. 
 
IV.   Women’s Equality-Maternity Choice Model 
National social policy and the labor market provide the institutional parameters within 
which women can exercise personal agency regarding both employment in paid work and 
extent of maternity. The social policy and market factors under which women choose claims 
based on equality (labor market participation), difference (stable or increasing fertility), or 
both are crucial to a full analysis of social policy and market effects on gender relations.  
These institutional factors shape the way in which women make rational choices in an effort to 
maximize personal satisfaction.  A proposed model of women’s choice between employment, 
reflecting agency via equality, versus fertility, reflecting agency via maternity, will be 
presented next.   
Women’s choices regarding fertility and employment vary depending upon the 
economic and social circumstances in which they find themselves.  The range of possibilities 
reflecting these choices between maternal employment and fertility levels is presented in 
Figure 1.  The four quadrants each represent patterns of how women might combine or trade-
off employment with motherhood in industrialized countries.  Changes over time in average 
hourly employment are represented on the x-axis; changes in national fertility levels are 
represented on the y-axis.      11
The choice model has several advantages over the current analyses of welfare regimes 
and gender effects therein.  First, it inherently incorporates market effects, which social policy 
is intended to ameliorate when negative.  But I do not think it is the intention of either welfare 
theorists or policy makers to amend market effects when they are positive.  Consequently, 
both sources of provision are important in determining the extent to which women’s burden of 
care is redistributed.   Second, by focusing on women’s actual behavior in the realms of paid 
versus unpaid work, the model provides evidence of which approach to equality is most 
prevalent and under what combination of market and policy provisions.   This shifts the debate 
from theoretical desirability of the institutional inputs to consideration of the acceptability of 
institutional outputs.  Four output scenarios are depicted in the choice model. 
Quadrant I represents the Superwoman Choice.  Here, women aggressively pursue 
both paid work and maternity, representing material pursuit of both gender equality and 
difference.  This requires a strong labor market and some combination of social provisions or 
market factors that support domestic-related activities. If broad social provisions supporting 
maternal employment are either sufficient or the optimal way to ease the demands of family, 
then both fertility levels and employment should be higher in those countries with the most 
generous social supports for maternal employment.   
Alternately, the market can provide at least some of the same services that social 
policy provides.  While Esping-Andersen’s typology included either state or market provision 
of transfers, the relative effectiveness of state versus market supports is at yet unexplored.  For 
example, in this choice model, if the market is a sufficient or perhaps even more efficient way 
to deliver maternal employment supports, then fertility and employment should be higher in 
those countries with the most market-driven welfare regimes.      12
Quadrant II represents the Job-over-Maternity Choice.   Women in this quadrant 
increase their labor market participation, but this is facilitated by a concomitant reduction in 
fertility.  This would be expected where supports for maternity are insufficient to ameliorate 
the burden of it such as typically claimed within liberal welfare regimes, or where rewards for 
labor market participation are sufficiently high to shift a woman’s preference away from 
unpaid work in the home.   This represents a choice for labor market equality at the expense of 
maternity.  In this scenario, the immediate needs of production are being met, but societal 
reproduction may be jeopardized over time. 
Quadrant III represents Economic Disempowerment, where both labor force 
participation and fertility decline.  This would be expected where economic conditions are so 
poor that growth in labor force participation is difficult to achieve.  In addition, poor economic 
conditions are expected to continue indefinitely so that women reduce their fertility as well.  
Examples of this have been documented in the US during the Great Depression (Elder 1975), 
and more recently among former East Germans following economic unification (Witte & 
Wagner 1995).  In this scenario, all the institutions have failed to sustain either production or 
reproduction.   
Quadrant IV represents the Maternal Choice.   Women in this quadrant reduce 
employment in order to accommodate childbearing.  This trend is expected in conservative-
corporatist regimes where traditional family structures are reinforced and forces women to be 
economically dependent on a male breadwinner.  This choice is also possible, however, if 
women receive sufficient transfers from the state to de-commodify from the market for 
maternity.  This scenario reflects the ideal for those preferring gender equality of difference 
over labor market equality.     13
 
V. Method and Data 
The choice model presumes a woman is deciding between two alternatives in order to 
make herself better off.   The two alternatives to be assessed here are changes in maternal 
employment versus changes in fertility level in eight countries. Four of the countries analyzed 
represent liberal welfare regimes (Australia, Canada, the UK and US); two represent 
conservative-corporatist regimes (Germany and Luxembourg); and two represent social-
democratic regimes (Sweden and Finland).   
Using a simple change model eliminates heterogeneity in baseline levels that can 
obfuscate trends. Therefore, changes between mid-1980 and mid-1990 in average hourly 
employment are represented on the x-axis; changes in national fertility levels during the same 
time period are represented on the y-axis.  If preferences are shifting, the relative preference 
for one alternative versus the other will change over time.  
Data on changes in aggregate national fertility levels are derived from the OECD 
Health Data 1999 and the United Nations World Fertility Patterns 1997.  Data on changes in 
average number of children and female employment are obtained from the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS).  LIS is an archive of microdata sets from 25 industrialized countries 
including demographic, labor market, and income data at the household and individual levels.  
The eight countries selected are those for which the necessary variables were available for 
both time periods.  For the earlier time period, datasets used were LIS Wave II surveys from 
1984-1987; the second time period was from LIS Wave IV surveys from 1994-1995.  
Three variables are used to form the basis for measuring change in employment: 
average number of weeks in the past year worked at full-time employment; average number of     14
weeks in the past year worked at part-time employment; and average hours per week worked.  
The most detailed variable is average hours per week employed.    This variable was available 
for both time periods for six of the eight countries.  Alternate employment calculations were 
derived for the two countries, Finland and Sweden, which did not have full information on 
average hours of paid work per week.  For Sweden, the extent of work variables were missing 
for the mid-1980’s (LIS Wave II), so the information was derived from that country’s 1991 
survey (LIS Wave III).  For Finland, the average weekly hours variable was only available for 
Wave III.  Information on number of weeks of full-time versus part-time employment, 
however, was available for the requisite time periods.  The overall extent and change in part-
time work was minimal across the two time periods; the greatest change was in weeks of full-
time employment.  Consequently, the change in weeks of full-time work was used to compute 
an average change in weekly hours.
5 
For each country and time period, a sample was selected of all adult females age 18 to 
55 with the youngest child under 7 years of age.   This group of females was selected as being 
the most likely to have the greatest family barriers to employment.  The age of the youngest 
child was selected as being the latest year for which public primary school starts in all 
countries selected (See Gornick, et al 1997).  
 
VI. Findings 
A.  Changes in Employment Among Mothers with Young Children 
The changes in hours of employment between the mid-1980’s and mid-1990 for 
mothers with children under 7 years of age are presented in Table 3.  In the baseline period of 
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the mid-1980’s, Canada and the US had the highest employment among mothers with young 
children, with mothers in both countries averaging over 24 hours per week. Sweden had the 
next highest average at 23.68 hours per week, followed by the UK at 21.84.  Despite its social 
provisions in support of maternal employment, Finland’s mothers averaged just 18.59 hours 
per week, on par with the two corporatist-conservative countries, Germany (20.01) and 
Luxembourg (17.82).   Australian mothers were least likely to be employed, working an 
average of just 3.50 hours per week in mid-1980. 
In the ensuing decade, country patterns diverge markedly.  As to be expected in those 
countries promoting employment most aggressively, average hours of employment increased 
in Australia, the US, Sweden and the UK.  But maternal employment declined in Canada and 
Finland, both countries with policies encouraging it.  Declines in average hours of maternal 
employment also occurred in Luxembourg and Germany, with the greatest decline occurring 
in Germany.  To test whether the severity of Germany’s decline was related to that country’s 
economic unification with East Germany, Wave IV analyses were run selecting only for 
women in the former West Germany.  This makes the most recent sample commensurate with 
the 1985 sample when only West Germans were interviewed for the panel.  Among West 
German mothers with young children, however, declines in employment were even greater 
than for the combined sample, over 11 hours per week less than in mid-1980.   
Changes in employment hours, however, vary depending upon general economic 
conditions.  Change in total population average hours of employment was also calculated for 
each country to determine whether maternal employment reflects or is disparate with trends 
for the adult population as a whole.  These national changes in average hours of employment 
for all adults between the two time periods are shown in the last column of Table 3.       16
In Australia, changes in maternal employment follow the national trend, with the 
growth in average hours of maternal employment (+7.72) reflecting a smaller proportion of 
the total growth (+21.59).  In Canada and Finland, overall employment declined between mid-
1980 and mid-1990, with average hours of employment among mothers with young children 
declining even more steeply.  In the two corporatist-democratic regimes of Germany and 
Luxembourg, total employment increased while maternal employment decreased.    
In the remaining three countries, the trends among mothers with young children 
actually outpaced total population trends.  In Sweden and the US, average hours of 
employment among the adult population increased, but average hours of employment among 
mothers with young children increased even more. In the UK, the average among the total 
population actually decreased by 7.66 hours per week, so the modest .84 hour increase among 
women with small children reflects an even greater relative maternal employment gain than in 
the US and Sweden.   
In general, the results for the liberal regimes could be predicted from Esping-
Andersen’s typology, in that the average hours of employment among mothers with young 
children have increased.  Yet this growth is more aggressive relative to the total population in 
the US, UK and Sweden than in Australia.  Further, Finland and Canada diverge from 
expected regime patterns.  Despite supportive social provisions (Finland) or market pressures 
(Canada) encouraging maternal employment, in countries with recessionary economies, 
employment among mothers decreased more sharply than among the population as a whole.  
Finally, while it is expected that corporatist-conservative regimes discourage maternal 
employment, it is unclear why the average hours among mothers in Luxembourg and 
Germany have declined even further when overall employment increased.        17
Interpreting these results in the aggregate assumes that the relative level of maternity is 
the same in each of the countries, which provides no insight into the type of gender agency the 
institutions encourage. To determine whether the combination of state and market factors 
encourages women to pursue claims based on equality versus difference, changes in 
employment need to be juxtaposed against changes in national fertility.  These results are 
discussed next.  
 
B.  Relative Changes in Maternal Employment and Fertility 
Based on the choice model presented earlier, one can predict quadrant membership of 
each of the eight countries.  If extensive social provisions reduce the burden of unpaid 
domestic work and a dual-earner model encourages employment, both Sweden and Finland 
should be in Quadrant I, representing Superwomen empowered by the state and market to 
pursue both work and family.  The four English-speaking countries should be in Quadrant II, 
where maternal employment is increasing under market incentives, but at the expense of 
fertility given lack of social provisions to ease the burden of unpaid work.  The shock of 
economic unification could well predict that Germany might be in Quadrant III, or as a 
corporatist-conservative country, share Quadrant IV membership with Luxembourg.   
Quadrant IV membership is one where fertility is achieved by reducing employment, such as 
under the traditional male breadwinner model. As noted earlier, Quadrant IV membership 
would also occur in that as yet unborn industrialized state where social provisions for 
motherhood allow women to exit the market for maternity at no loss of economic equivalence 
with married and working women or men.     18
    As shown in Figure 2, only three of the countries, Australia, Germany and 
Luxembourg, actually place in their theorized quadrants.  The remaining anomalies provide 
insight into the interplay between market and social policy provisions as they encourage 
gender agency.  First, the placements of Finland, Canada and the UK illustrate the effects of 
general economic conditions on women’s choices.  As noted in Table 3, these three countries 
are the ones experiencing general declines in average hours of weekly employment for the 
population as a whole, as well as among mothers with young children across the decade being 
analyzed.   Finland had the smallest decline in total employment as well as maternal 
employment, suggesting that the economic recession was not perceived as severe or long-
lasting enough to reduce fertility rates.  As indications of general economic difficulties 
become more acute, declines in fertility also become more acute.  One could conjecture that if 
the general economic conditions improved to an equal level in all three countries, change in 
maternal employment would move to the right on the model, ultimately placing each country 
in its predicted quadrant. 
The relative placements of Sweden and the US are more surprising.  Sweden, despite 
its social-democratic dual earner model, appears to have encouraged gender agency based on 
equality at the expense of fertility.  In contrast, only the US, with its liberal welfare regime, 
appears to have created sufficient agency for women to pursue both paid and unpaid work.    
Sweden’s relative placement on the choice model is less surprising given the history of 
the social supports for maternal employment.  As pointed out by Jenson and Mahon, the 
Swedish social provisions encouraging maternal employment evolved, “more in the sphere of 
distribution than that of production” (1993, pp. 84).   Policies ensured that women’s wages     19
were more commensurate with men’s, but women’s access to private sector jobs was not 
expanded and their responsibility for reproductive work remained. 
Lewis and Astrom (1992) expressed similar concern with the Swedish model, claiming 
that while it resulted in significant gains for women, serious problems remain.  First, there is 
substantial sex segregation in employment, with women over-represented in public 
employment while men maintain dominance in both high-level and private employment.   
Second, the Swedish model is not gender-neutral, in that the policies forced women to add 
paid employment on top of unpaid care work without demanding any changes in men’s 
activities.   
The evidence here suggests these authors’ caution is warranted, supporting Orloff’s 
claim that, “the claims bases delineated by Esping-Andersen, Korpi, and others as important 
for the character of social rights must also be considered in terms of their gender content and 
that some concerns of women cannot be satisfied even by the generous social-democratic 
policy approach” (1996, pp. 67).  Social support for maternal employment without equitable 
labor market access or other means of encouraging greater sharing of unpaid work is 
insufficient to sustain fertility.  
The importance of market factors is evidenced further by the unique placement of US 
mothers in Quadrant 1.  How is it that mothers in the theoretical laggard of social policy are 
realizing greater equality on both dimensions of gender equality between mid-1980 and mid-
1990?    The US economy was growing and robust during the time period being analyzed.  
This might suggest that under favorable economic circumstances market factors are more 
efficient supports of both maternal employment and fertility than are targeted social 
provisions.  If this were true, however, Australia should also be in Quadrant 1.       20
A unique feature of the US, however, is its strong reliance on the market with less 
concern for redistribution so that all classes are afforded the same opportunities.   
Consequently, the aggregate country comparisons could be hiding class differences in both 
employment and fertility.  Whereas market forces might garner equality among women with 
the greatest economic capital, they might exacerbate inequality among those with less 
economic capital.  For this latter group of women, social policy might be needed to   
ameliorate class distinctions in terms of women’s ability to pursue both employment and 
family.  Therefore, before drawing conclusions about the relative value of social policy versus 
the market in encouraging gender equality via production versus reproduction, possible class 
differentials should be analyzed. 
 
C.  Social Class Stratification of Market and Policy on Gender Agency 
Based on household labor earnings contained within LIS, each country sample was 
subdivided into three groups representing the lowest income, middle income and highest 
income.  Those households earning 25 percent or less of the national median household 
income were designated the lowest income group; households earning 26 to 74 percent of the 
national median income were designated the middle income group; and the upper quartile of 
earnings represented the high income group.  Household income was used rather than 
individual income since it influences the need to work (versus preference) and is necessary to 
find possible shifts in gender relations at the family level.  If mothers are working either the 
same or more hours as the total income group, this indicates some rejection of the traditional 
male breadwinner model.  It may be a marker of greater economic autonomy or shifting intra-
family equality.       21
Changes in both the income group population and employment levels of mothers with 
children under the age of seven are presented in Table 4.  Also presented are changes in 
average number of children for the group, and then for mothers with at least one child.  For 
each country, the change in hours of employment for mothers with young children versus the 
income groups’ overall change in average number of children is plotted by income level in 
Figures 3 (low income), Figure 4 (middle income) and Figure 5 (high income).  
Germany’s three income groups remain within the same quadrant on the choice model 
regardless of social class.  Mothers with young children in all income groups have reduced 
their hours of employment over the past decade, but the change in the average number of 
children across the population groups has been positive. This suggests that the predominance 
of the male breadwinner model has continued across the decade in Germany.  Of note, 
however, is that the two extreme income groups—low and high—are more similar to each 
other than either is to the middle income group.  Mothers in both low and high income 
households reduced hours of employment by more than 10 per week, with approximately 
equal increases in average number of children.  In contrast, the middle income mothers 
reduced employment hours by just six per week and the increase in the group’s average 
number of children was much more modest at .02.  This suggests that middle-income German 
women might slowly be rejecting reliance on the male breadwinner model, despite that 
country’s lack of social policy provisions in support of maternal employment. 
Luxembourg also displays a consistent male breadwinner model in that maternal 
employment has declined across the decade.  The gains in fertility, however, are only realized 
among the lowest income group, while fertility among the middle and upper income groups is 
declining.  This suggests that while mothers may still reduce employment, women in the     22
higher income groups may be reducing motherhood.  It is also worth noting that 
Luxembourg’s largest ethnic minority, Portugese, is over-represented among the low-income 
group.  It is possible that the observed increase in fertility among the low income group may 
be confounded by cultural differences between immigrants from a southern European Catholic 
culture, versus their new northern European country home.   
Sweden displays similar fertility trends to Luxembourg.  While hours of maternal 
employment have increased across income groups, fertility is only increasing among the 
lowest income group.  It should be noted that among Sweden’s low-income group, the average 
number of children at baseline was less than half the average number for the middle and upper 
income groups, and the increase still leaves this group’s average fertility well-below that of 
the other groups.  In addition, the increase in hours of employment among low-income 
mothers was more modest than among higher-income mothers.  Together these data suggest 
that, despite Sweden’s broad social provisions supporting maternal employment, they yield 
only modest increases in employment among the lowest-income mothers, and are not 
sufficient to encourage fertility among higher-income groups.   A model based on encouraging 
maternal employment seems to do better at encouraging employment rather than maternity.  
This is a first indication that social policy needs to more squarely reward the value of unpaid 
reproductive work, not just subsidize its cost.  
For Finland, LIS data reveal a starkly different fertility trend than that reported in the 
aggregate OECD fertility statistics.  Across all income groups, the average number of children 
has declined between mid-1980 and mid-1990 by an almost equal amount.  The lower and 
middle income mothers realized a decline in hours of work during this time, while among high 
income mothers, hours of work increased slightly.  Given Finland’s economic circumstances     23
during the time period being analyzed, these results are neither surprising nor necessarily 
negative.  Patterns of maternal employment and class fertility need to be analyzed under better 
economic conditions to see how Finland’s social policy provisions are similar to or differ from 
their Nordic neighbor. 
Analysis for the different income groups in the liberal welfare regimes reveals 
interesting first evidence of how policy and market factors combine in creating gender agency.  
Australia, like Germany, remains in the same theory-appropriate quadrant regardless of 
income group.  As predicted, increases in maternal employment in Australia coincide with 
decreases in fertility.  The increase in hours of maternal employment was greatest among 
high-income households; the decline in fertility was the sharpest among the middle-income 
group.  This suggests that there might be some threshold level of wealth necessary to have the 
market support some of the burden of care.  But either these market supports are not 
sufficient, or preferences for paid versus unpaid work among women are shifting so that even 
higher-income women are reducing fertility. 
This seeming preference for work over fertility among high-income women is evident 
in Canada as well.  The average hours of maternal employment per week declined the least 
among the high-income group, but fertility in this group declined as well.  The lowest income 
group displayed male-breadwinner tendencies, with the increase in fertility among this group 
accompanying the greatest decrease in hours of maternal employment.  The greatest loss in 
fertility, as with Australia, is within the middle income group despite Canadian mother’s 
decrease in hours worked.   
That a threshold of wealth seems necessary to let the market support maternal 
employment is also evident in the US.  All three income groups saw increases in maternal     24
employment, but an increase in fertility only occurred among the highest income households.    
The greatest increase in maternal employment and largest decline in fertility occurred among 
the lowest income group.  So in the US, the market is not equally accessible as a mechanism 
for supporting maternity; clear stratification effects are evident.  What should be disturbing 
even to political conservatives, however, is that the middle income households appear to have 
equal difficulty accessing market supports for maternity as do the lowest-income ones. Among 
middle-income households, the average hours of maternal employment increased even more 
than they did among high-income households, but declines in fertility were commensurate 
with the declines among the low-income group. 
In the UK, the greatest decline in fertility occurred among the low-income group, 
followed closely by the middle-income group.  Only high-income households increased 
fertility, although even among this group, employment among mothers declined.  This 
suggests that despite economic prosperity in a market economy, the male breadwinner model 
is maintained in the UK as has been argued elsewhere (Lewis 1992).  For the UK, it would 
appear that the market is not encouraging gender agency either via market equality or 
maternity differences.   
 
VII. Conclusions 
Social policy, the market and family institutions intersect to form the boundaries 
within which women can exercise agency.  Women’s expression of this agency in terms of 
changes in maternal employment and maternity provides a yardstick by which to compare and 
assess the effectiveness of different welfare regimes.  Evidence presented here suggests that 
the market can provide support for maternal employment, thereby enabling some aspects of     25
gender equality.  This support, however, appears available only to the most privileged classes 
with the greatest access to capital.  While maternal employment is encouraged, both low and 
middle-income women tend to trade-off unpaid for paid work.  If social policy is intended to 
redistribute some of this access to less advantaged social groups, it does not appear to be doing 
a very good job of it.  Women are voting with their wombs, with a decline in fertility the norm 
across welfare regimes and income groups. 
These results point to a need for fundamental rethinking of policy approaches across 
regimes.  First, while the market might currently support both paid and unpaid work agency 
among high-income women in the US, this market is reliant upon an abundance of low-wage 
workers for its sustainability.   If fertility among this low-wage group is declining, market-
provided supports will evaporate and this stratum of women will again face the dilemma of 
their grandmothers unless men begin to assume an equal burden of care.   Evidence from 
Sweden further supports that it is not enough to provide services for women to work, but the 
fundamental burden of reproductive work must be shared by both genders. 
Second, there is evidence that market rewards among the highest-income women in 
Australia, Sweden and Finland might actually be shifting women’s preferences away from 
maternity in favor of equality in paid work.  That this appears to be occurring among the two 
social-democratic regimes with the greatest maternal supports for employment should give 
pause to policy makers and theorists alike.  Rather than tweak existing mainstream welfare 
regime typologies with gender amendments, a more fully gendered model is necessary if a 
balance between employment and fertility is to be restored.  The relative effects of social 
policy elements and market factors need to be explicated and analyzed across industrialized     26
countries, and across social classes and ethnic groups within countries.  Only then can we 
begin to answer the two questions put forth at the beginning of this paper. 
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  Abortion     Abortion           Contraceptive Use
 d 
  Early  Pg.
 a  
   Rate
 b Early  Pg.
 c               Any   /   Modern 
Australia      Hardship   76  %  72  % 
Austria   Elective         Elective    47  33 
Belgium  Illegal        Elective   79  75 
Canada    No statute        Elective    75  75 
Denmark  Elective    18.6    Elective, P    78  72 
Finland  Hardship    11.7    Hardship    77  75 
France   Hardship    13.3    Elective, P    75  69 
Germany  Hardship      5.9     Elective    75  72   
Greece   Elective         Elective,  P   n/a  n/a    
Ireland   Illegal          Danger    n/a  n/a 
Italy    Hardship    13.5     Elective    78  32 
Luxembourg  Hardship    --    n/a  n/a 
Netherlands  Hardship      5.1     Elective    77  75 
Norway  Elective    14.8    Elective, P    74  69 
Portugal  Danger         Hardship, P    66  33 
Spain   Danger          Hardship   81  67 
Switzerland  Danger          Hardship   n/a  n/a 
Sweden  Elective    19.8    Elective    78  71 
UK   Hardship      15.5   Hardship   82  82 




a.  Glendon, Mary Ann (1987).  Abortion and Divorce in Western Law.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. David, Henry P. (1992).  “Abortion in Europe, 1920-1991:  A Public Health Perspective.”  Studies in 
Family Planning 23:1 (pp. 1-22).  Rate listed is number of abortions per 1,000 women aged 15-44. 
“Elective” indicates those laws that allow a woman to obtain abortion on demand; “Hardship” indicates 
those laws that require a women indicate some level of mental, physical or financial hardship before granting 
an abortion; and “Danger” indicates those laws requiring that the woman’s or fetus’ life be in danger before 
granting an abortion. 
b.  Rahman, Anika, Laura Katzive, & Stanley K. Henshaw (1998).  “A Global Review of Laws on Induced 
Abortion, 1985-1997.”  International Family Planning Perspectives 24:2 (pp. 56-64).  “P” indicates Parental 
Authorization required in case of minor seeking abortion. 
c.    United Nations Population Division and World Health Organization, World Population Monitoring 2000. 
 
1980’s  1990’s    30
 
    
-TABLE 2- 
Percent Civilian Employment in Service Sector  
In 10 Industrialized Countries 
 
Year                     1970    1980    1990    1998      ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆1980-98 
Australia    57 %    65 %    71%    74%     9 % 
Canada      63   67   72   74        7 
France      48   56   65   71    15 
Germany    43   52   58   63    11 
Italy      40   48   59   61    13 
Japan      47   55   59   63        8 
Netherlands    56   65   70   na        - 
Sweden    54   63   68   72        9 
United Kingdom  54    61    68    na           - 
United States    62    67    72    75     8 
 
 
      Source:  US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, October 22, 1999:       





Average Weekly Hours of Employment for  
Mothers with Young Children:  
Mid-1980 versus Mid-1990 
 
            
          
            Average Hours/   Average Hours/    Change in Employment 
           Week              Week             Mothers
a        Total
b 
Australia    3.50  11.22  +  7.72  +21.59   
Canada 24.72  20.46  -  4.26  -  1.22 
Finland 18.59  16.29  -  2.30  -  0.68 
Germany 20.01  10.54  -  9.47  +  1.93 
Luxembourg 17.82  14.58  -  3.23  +  7.10 
Sweden
c  23.68  28.93   +  5.25 +  4.11 
UK 21.84  14.18  +  0.84  -  7.66 
US 24.87  30.79  +    5.92  +  5.13 
 
a.  Adult women age 18 to 55 with youngest child less than 7 years old. 
b.  Change in employment among all adults age 18 to 55 (individual periods not shown).  
c.    Earlier time period data from 1991 survey. 
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-TABLE 4- 
Change in Maternal Employment versus Average Number of Children 
by Income Quartile 
 
  Low Income  Middle Income                 High Income 
                             Total   Mothers       Total    Mothers           Total     Mothers 
Australia 
  Change Hrs/Week   13.18      1.92  22.40    7.46    25.42   14.76 
  Change No. Kids  - 0.13    1.48  - 0.30    1.02  -   0.16    1.39          
Canada  
  Change Hrs/Week  - 5.00  - 7.99  - 0.56   - 4.42  -  0.03  - 1.17 
  Change No. Kids     0.01    1.40  - 0.09    1.20  -  0.03     1.42 
Finland 
  Change Hrs/Week  - 6.71  - 4.51  - 0.54  - 3.72      2.14     1.38 
  Change No. Kids  - 0.08     0.21  - 0.08     0.36  -   0.07     0.16 
Germany 
  Change Hrs/Week  - 0.56    -11.67    3.20  - 6.54    1.19  -13.63 
  Change No. Kids     0.07     1.33    0.03     1.23    0.10    1.66 
Luxembourg 
  Change Hrs/Week    4.22  - 3.41    6.73  - 3.27     10.34  - 2.53 
  Change No. Kids    0.07     1.55                 -  0.11     0.94  -   0.04    1.39 
Sweden 
  Change Hrs/Week  - 9.50    6.93    7.76   11.49     7.24    8.57 
  Change No. Kids     0.08    1.67  - 0.04    1.27  -  0.05    1.37 
UK  
  Change Hrs/Week  - 8.43  - 7.32  - 0.91  - 7.71  -  2.48  - 7.48 
  Change No. Kids  - 0.16     1.05  - 0.14     1.08     0.03    1.32 
US 
  Change Hrs/Week     6.20     6.42     4.77     5.70    5.00       5.68 
  Change No. Kids  - 0.09  - 0.01  - 0.08  -   0.06    0.05       0.07 
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